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THE LAW OF RADIO COMMUNICA-
TION WITH PARTICULAR REFER-
ENCE TO A PROPERTY RIGHT
IN A RADIO WAVE LENGTH
JAMES PATRICK TAUGHER
II. COMMON LAW RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES AS
BETWEEN STATIONSAS THE radio industry grew, wave-lengths were bought and sold
and broadcasting stations changed hands for a consideration. 7
.The Department of Commerce made a practice of transferring the
license to the purchasers"8 and, to that extent, at least, recognized that
a wave-length might have a salable value. So long as the stations
were few and far between no great difficulty arose, but the recent
overtaxing of the available wave-length "channels" has caused an inter-
ference which is the present subject of complaint for both broadcaster
and listener. Such interference can arise in one of two ways: either
by one of two stations in the same locality; which have agreed to divide
the use of a wave-length, ignoring the agreement and broadcasting
simultaneously with the other station; or by a station which has made
no such agreement using a wave-length similar to that of another
station. It is obvious that the first of these situations is comparatively
simple to understand; the latter presents the formidable difficulties
that raise new and novel questions in the courts and urge a consider-
ation of the law applicable for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
old adage, "Old laws should be adapted to new facts," should be
applied.
A. WHERE INTER-STATION RIGHTS ARE GOVERNED BY CONTRACT
OR AGREEMENT
The Department of Commerce, when called upon to issue licenses
located in the same neighborhood, as a condition precedent to such
issue, required the stations to agree between themselves on hours of
broadcasting and assigned to them a single wave-length? 9 Many
stations made the best of the situation and, by contract, worked out
a satisfactory and amicable schedule of hours. The Zenith decision,
however, caused a number of these stations to feel dissatisfied and
" Radio Control, pp. 45, 72.
'Radio Control, p. 1x8.
'Radio Control, p. 268.
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they felt it their privilege to disregard the schedule of hours and to
use the assigned wave-length at will. This tendency, however, was
definitely checked by the decision in Carmichael v. Anderson,0 which
dealt with such a situation. Said the court, per Reeves, J.:
While, by Section IOOI, U. S. Comp. Sts., the Secretary of Com-
merce may be without power to impose restrictions other than those
contained in the legislative act, yet he would undoubtedly have the power
and right to grant licenses with such restrictions as the parties interested
might agree upon. The defendant has no right to resent such restriction
as he is not only bound by the license granted by the Secretary of Com-
merce, but he is in like manner bound by the arrangement of his pred-
ecessor with the plaintiff as to the schedule of hours. Plaintiff is en-
titled to relief (by injunction).
The court clearly recognizes the binding force of the contract apart
from the (invalid) 6 ' requirements of the Department of Commerce.
The injunction, in such a case, seems to be the only adequate remedy
since the advantage gained by a station, through its broadcasting, is
so problematical that it cannot be measured to assess money damages.
It would be impossible to estimate how many of the complainant's
listeners were turned away by the pirate activities of the defendant
on his claimed mare liberum, the ether. Also, an injunction would
call for no embarrassing supervision of performance.
B. WHERE THERE Is No CONTRACT BETWEEN STATIONS
The older stations have been steadfast in their refusal to divide time
of operation with the newer stations and have claimed the exclusive
right to use a wave-length free from interference, by reason of priority
of appropriation. 62 When a station has, over a period of time, used
a certain wave-length for the dissemination of its programs, it would
seem entirely plausible that there is a basis for the claim that it has
acquired a property therein. As yet, there is but a single circuit
court decision sustaining such a claim. 63 The Circuit Court of Cook
County, Illinois, in deciding in favor of the complainant in Tribune
Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station et al, was influenced by four
types of common law cases, i.e., (I) electric wire interference, (2) prior
appropriation of water, (3) ejectment and (4) trade-name cases.
These will be separately treated in their order.
It is firmly established that as between companies of the same class,
14 Fed. (2nd) 166, W.D. Mo. July i, 1926.
'The court was in error if it based its decision on the power of the Secretary
of Commerce to put restrictions in the license. Such power is denied by the
Zenith decision and the opinion of the Att'y-Gen., supra.
'This claim to a vested right will be discussed, post, XXX.
'Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station, Circuit Court of Cook
County, Ill., Nov. 17, 1926, Gen. No. B-1 36,864.
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that is, as between light, power and telephone companies, priority of
occupation creates a priority in right. Their rights to use an un-
occupied highway may be equal, but the one which is subsequent in
time must be so exercised as not to impair substantially the exercise
of the prior right. This principle is applicable alike in cases involving
electrical interference by induction as well as by conduction. There
is, apparently, no difference in principle as between two stations en-
gaged in broadcasting. The common law regulating the rights of
those who transmit electrical energy over wires would seem to be no
different from that governing those who transmit without the use of
wires, inasmuch as the object sought is the same and the interference
similar (particularly in the induction cases). The fact that the inter-
ference is not physically visible does not distinguish in principle. A
wave-length channel through the ether is merely less substantial than
a wire strung between two points. It may be that before either com-
pany commenced broadcasting both enjoyed equal rights to the use
of the air. But an analysis of the cases will show the effect of prior
occupation of a wave-channel by a station.
4
In Edison Electric Illuminating Co. v. Citizens Electric Co. five
propositions are noted: (I) As between electrical companies exer-
cising similar franchises upon the same streets priority carries superi-
ority of right. (2) The subsequent licensee is under the duty so to
construct and maintain its wires and lines as not to interfere with
the right of the prior occupant of the streets to maintain and operate
its lines efficiently. (3) Equity will enjoin all interference of junior
companies with senior companies which is not strictly unavoidable,
and this without regard to the extra cost of the methods which might
be necessary for the junior company to use to prevent such interfer-
ence.65  (4) The company having the prior right in the street is en-
titled to use as much space therein as is reasonably necessary for the
safe and successful operation of its lines, including any additional space
that it may be reasonably anticipated will become necessary in the
future for the growth and enlargement of its business. (5) There
is no right, without the consent of the other party, in one electric
company to attach in any way its wires to the poles of another electric
light company, or to attach the wires of another electric light company
to its own poles.
Although physical content was the cause of the interference in the
Edison case, it is not difficult to apply the propositions to an over-
," 235 Penn. 492, 849, 438 (1912). See also Chi. Tel. Co. v. Northwestern
Tel Co., 199 Ill. 324; Joyce, Electrical Law, Sec. 517.
'In the Tribune case the bill charged and the answer admitted that other
wave-lengths were available.
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lapping of radio frequencies. Some cases go so far as to declare that
even if the interference is unavoidable the later company must give
way, and the fact that it is under contract with the municipality for
work of a public nature does not alter its position, or give it any claim
to preference.66 An order, restraining from any wanton, negligent or
unnecessary damage and compelling a removal of wires wherever it
can be done without extra cost, would be altogether too broad. Equity
will enjoin not only wanton or negligent damage, but also interference
which is not strictly unavoidable and that, too, without regard to the
added cost of other methods.
6 7
Not even the municipality itself which has granted the franchise
may compel a company to re-locate its poles so that the municipality
may install a city lighting system.68 If a mere prior user gives rights
to electric companies greater than those of the body granting the initial
privilege to locate, a fortiori, prior user must give prior right as be-
tween similar electric companies (or radio broadcasting stations if
these cases are taken as applicable to the field of radio).
Of course, a franchise could not operate to grant a monopoly.6 9
Nor is this a question entirely within the purview of the municipality
and beyond review of the courts. "Whatever rights are gained by
previous occupancy are valuable and substantial and by the strongest
sanctions of the organic law should be protected (by the courts).""
If rights of telephone companies, gained by prior occupancy do not
come within the purview of the municipality but come within the pur-
view of the courts (because prior occupancy gives a valuable and
substantial property right) the first radio broadcasting station that
appropriates a free wave-length ought, it seems, to get by prior oc-
cupancy a property right in such wave-length-not such a right as
would exclude all other broadcasters from the dial but a right that
cannot be extinguished by mere regulatory bodies.
SEdison Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Merchants' & Man'f'rs Elec. Light
& Power Co., 20O Penn. 2o9, 49 A. 766.
' Same case.
'Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Los Angeles (Dist. Ct., S.D. Cal.,
S.D. 1917), 2rq Fed. 212. Affirmed on Appeal: 251 U.S. 32, 64 L. Ed. 121. See
Paris Elec. Light Co. v. Southwestern Tel. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S.W. 902;
Rutland Elec. Light Co. v. Marble City Elec. Light Co., 65 Vt. 377, 26 A. 635, 20
L.R.A. 821, 36 A. St. Rep. 868; Edison Elec. Co. v. Citizens Elec Co., 235 Pa. 497,
84 A. 438. See also, Bell Tel. Co. v. Bellville Elec. Co., 12 Ont. Rep (Queen's
Bench Div.) 1571; Western Union Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles Elec. Co.,
(C.C.) 76 Fed. 178.
"'Northern Telephone Co. v. Iowa Telephone Co., 94 N.W. 113 (1904).
" Northwestern Telephone Exchange Co. v. Twin City Telephone Co., 89 Minn.
495, 95 N.W. 46o (19o3).
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Where interference is unavoidable the courts do not say "the later
occupant must not construct or operate negligently" but in clear
terms state: "Must give way." This language would seem to support
the proposition that the prior occupancy of a means of communication
gives a right which is absolute and not confined to mere freedom
from interference by negligent operation or construction of a com-
petitor's equipment. If interference results the later occupant may
not plead that all means have been employed to prevent interference
and that the rival's right is but co-extensive with its own but must
retire from the field absolutely as having no rights. This does not
mean, however, that prior occupancy gives monopoly rights if the
later occupant can operate without causing interference. The right
of the prior occupant is limited by the use. As applied to the field of
radio this statement is readily intelligible. An appropriation of a wave-
length certainly could not confer upon the first user the" right to
unlimited appropriation of the medium. It is possible to employ at
one time (where there is no deliberate broadening of the wave) but
a small fraction of the medium. The fact that the user has the physi-
cal power to wander abroad should not confer rights greater than
those that might be gained by an individual who stakes out a claim
to land but who has a propensity to wander abroad and claim all
territories attainable. A transient's trespass confers no rights by
adverse possession. There must be a user, a substantial possession.
The same should be true of radio wave-length appropriations. The
user should be so distinctive as to be notoriously single. The con-
stricted field of radio communication makes such a limitation im-
perative. This thought will be further emphasized when an analysis
is made of the Trade-name cases wherein constant emphasis put upon
something so intangible as a mere name has given valuable property
rights.
As bearing upon the limit of powers of appropriation, further
language in Northwestern Telephone Exchange Co. v. Twin City Tele-
phone Co.7 1 is instructive. After stating that the relative privileges
of each occupant had been determined by statute and ordinance the
court went on to say:
"While it is probable that a first constructing company might desire
to secure rights to itself that would create a monopoly of space by
erecting its poles to such a height as would render it impossible to go
over its wires . . . . the courts must . . . . so control the action
and the relative rights of the parties as to protect each in the enjoy-
ment of its franchise, recognizing, however, the benefits which accrue
by reason of prior occupancy.
If this holding is taken as applicable to radio it would seem to confine
"Supra.
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the appropriation of a wave-length to a limited sphere even as to the
use of a single wave-length-perhaps in the time to be allotted to the
user during which the so-called property right may be enjoyed. Be
that as it may, such regulatory legislation is wanting at this early
stage of radio's development. The query then is: Is the right gained
co-extensive with the appropriation and superior to regulation to be
attempted at a later date ?72
A case involving true "wireless" interference is that of Yamhill
Telephone Co. v. Yamhill Electric Co. 7 3  The bill alleged that the
defendant electric company was constructing a power line which would
cause a loud buzzing sound over the telephone wires and in the tele-
phones of the plaintiff to such an extent as to make it impossible to
hear or understand the human voice. An injunction issued and the
power line was removed. The power line of the defendant and the
telephone wires of the plaintiff were very much like radio antennoe as
respects the manner in which the interference was caused. In the
case of radio, also, interference from a competitor's wave-length causes
an intelligible sound. Whether it is called a buzz or a confusion of
voices and music matters little. The effect is the same. The remedy
should be the same-Move over ! 4
A later Vermont case, Western Telegraph Co. v. Burlington Traction
Co., (Vt. I916),15 after discussing interference by induction and its
prevention made the following order: "The petitioner is required to
separate its line of poles . . . . to the minimum distance of thirty
feet from the line of poles of the petitioner or cease using its line for
the transmission of high-tension current until separation is made."
Judge Wilson's order in the Tribune case seems like a paraphrase:
"The court feels that a distance removed fifty kilocycles from the
wave-length of the complainant would be a safe distance, etc. ' '76
" To be discussed in connection with the Water Appropriation cases and divi-
sion III, post.
*3224 Pac. io8i (Ore. 1914).
' The doctrine of the electrical interference cases is now recognized by
statute in S. Dak., Chap. 369, Laws, 1913; Tri-County Mut. Tel. Co. v. Bridge-
water Elec. Power Co. (S.D. 1918) 167 N.W. 501. See also, Thompson's Law
of Electricity; Am. Tel. Co. v. Morgan Tel. Co., 138 Ala. 597, 36 So. 178 (19o3) ;
Nebraska Tel. Co. v. York Elec. Light Co., 27 Neb. 284, 43 N.W. 126; Peoria
Waterworks v. Peoria Ry. Co. (Circ. Ct., No. Dist., Ill. E. Div.), i8I Fed. 990
(igio); Montgomery Light & Water Co. v. Citisens' Light, Heat & Power Co.,
142 Ala. 462, 38 So. lO26; Consolidated Elec. Light Co. v. People's Elec. Light
Co., IO So. 44o (1892 Ala.); Paris Elec. Light Co. v. S.W. Tel. Co. (C.C.A.
Tex., 1894) 27 S.W. 902 (All companies of the same class.)
Z99 A. 4 (Vt., 1916).
"See Chicago Tribune, Nov. 18, 1926.
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The analogy, as worked out through these cases, would seem to lend
distinct support to the theory of rights gained by prior occupation of
space by radio broadcasters who send their waves of energy through
the ether, rather than through wires.
There are, olviously, many difficulties besetting the use of the second
analogy, that of prior appropriation of water. The ether must be con-
sidered (to carry out the analogy) as somewhat like the free air, light
and water, which, as Chancellor Kent- says, "are the subjects of a
qualified property by occupancy." And Blackstone:
But, after all, there are some few things which, notwithstanding the
general introduction and continuance of property, must still unavoid-
ably remain in common, being such wherein nothing but a usufructuary
property is capable of being had; and, therefore, they belong to the first
occupant during the term he holds possession of them and no longer. 78
And there are cases holding that one may reduce severed portions of
the water of a running stream to his possession by introducing it
into a pipe, aqueduct or reservoir, and thus acquire ownership as of
personal property so long as one retains control of the severed
portion.7 9 But such a doctrine, as applied to radio, presents a difficulty.
The radio station is not reducing any severable portion of the air or
water to its control; it is merely sending out waves of energy into the
ether; the wave-length is only a measurement of the projected electrical
energy.
There is another application of the analogy of running water based
on the common law doctrine or riparian rights which presents possi-
bilities as well as difficulties. It may very well be argued that the
ether is open to all broadcasters who wish to use it just as the land-
owner through or past whose premises the stream of water runs has
a usufructuary right in the water and may demand that upper and
adjoining owners allow the stream to flow undiminished and is under
the corresponding duty not to interfere with the flow to their detri-
ment. 0 If this doctrine is applicable to radio every station owner
would then seem to have but a joint usufructuary right to broadcast
without excluding other station owners from the air-the use of the
ether.
It is submitted, however, that too much stress can be laid on the
admeasurement theory as distinguished from a reduction to control.
Omnis comparation claudicat-every comparison limps. Why should
not a station be considered as using the ether? When it is in operation
"' Kent, Comm., Part V, c. 35, p. 347.
2 B1. Comm. I4.
Hagermian Irrig. Co. v. McMurry, 16 N. Mex. 172, 113 Pac. 823 (1911) and
cases cited.
'Weil, "Running Water" (1909), 22 Harvard Law Rev. x9, 2o8.
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it, in effect, excludes all other stations in its vicinity from using its
wave-length (since such use would render both stations' programs
unintelligible). Even in the case of the riparian mill-owner his use
of the stream at his mill reduces the stream to his own exclusive use,
and at that point, renders it impossible for others to use the same
water. The radio broadcaster uses his band in the ether and then
passes it on to others. The similarity is quite apparent.
The utter novelty of the radio situation urges one irresistibly to
search for novel applications of the common law to see to what extent
the law can be extended to meet new emergencies. The utter confusion
and loss of investment which will inevitably result if "wave-pirating"
is not curbed urge the application of prior user principles to exhibit
a right in the use of a wave-length. Such a right has been upheld on
identical principles and reasoning in cases involving interference with
rights to water acquired by prior appropriation in the western states;
the same public policy is served, i.e., the avoidance of utter confusion
and loss of investment made on the strength of a custom. The
western doctrine, in brief, is: that the first appropriator of the water
of a stream, (or a part of it) passing through public lands of the
United States for some beneficial purpose, confers a right to the use
and enjoyment of the water to the extent of the original appropriation.
This doctrine applied to both mining and irrigation. The doctrine was
the outgrowth of customs of the pioneer miners and irrigators as
interpreted by the western states. When it was first attempted to
apply the common law doctrine of riparian rights, the courts decided
that while the common law doctrine might have been suited to densely
populated England at the time it grew up, the different physical and
social situation in the western part of the United States made the old
rule absolutely inapplicable.
The situation in the radio field is practically the same as that which
existed in the western states when the pioneers swarmed in and took
possession of the public domain. The same reasons which prompted
the courts to protect prior appropriators of water are persuasive as to
why prior appropriators of the ether should be protected. The de-
velopment of radio by investment of large sums of money on the part
of those who first used the ether are strikingly similar to the condi-
tions that existed in the western states when the vast area of the
public domain was opened up and people swarmed in. If the doctrine
of prior appropriation is recognized in the field of radio it will prevent
disorder and forcible dispossession (if one can be said to be "dis-
possessed of a wave-length) just as it did in the western states seventy
years ago."'
"As stated in Meng v. Coffey, 67 Neb. 5oo, 93 N.W. 713--"It was a crude
attempt to preserve order and the general peace, and to settle customary rights
LAW OF RADIO COMMUNICATION
Not only has -pror appropriation of water been recognized, but
periodical appropriation as well. 2 It seems that one may make a prior
appropriation of a certain quantity of water to be enjoyed for a
designated period of time, and, another person, an appropriation of a
like quantity from the same source during another period, and, as to
the same, be a prior appropriator himself. In other words, there
is no difference in principle between an appropriation measured by
quantity and an appropriation measured by time.83  In Salina Stock
Co. v. Salina Creek Irrigation Co.,s7- the court gave each of the appro-
priators the exclusive use of the water of the stream for certain periods
of the year, except that during the period, while one of them was held
to be entitled to the water, the other was given the right to a certain
portion of it on certain days of the week."' If the word "ether" is
substituted for "water" in the above discussion the analogy is made
very simple and plausible without a lengthy comparison with radio.
The western water cases may prove helpful in solving a further
difficulty. Granting that prior user gives a property right in a wave-
length, should the property extend to a further use of the same wave-
length under an increase of power, or should it apply only to operation
among a body of men subject to no law, under which so many and so valuable
rights arose that wheri the law stepped in it was obliged to recognize them."
See also Black's Pomeroy, Water Rights, Sec. 15; Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 14o
(1855); Atchison v. Peterson, 20 Wall. 507, 22 L. Ed. 414-
"And he who first connects his own labors with property thus situated and
open to general exploration does, in natural justice, acquire a better right
to its use and enjoyment than others who have not given such labor." Judge
Wilson found, in the Tribune case, that the Tribune station, WGN, had ex-
pended huge sums of money in developing its station and its patronage, whereas
the defendant, WGES, was new and unknown and had not expended such huge
sums.
' Cache La Poudre Reservoir Co. v. Water Supply and Storage Co., 25 Colo.
161, 46 L.R.A. 175.
' Kinney, Irrigation, Sec. 177 et seq., and cases cited; Black Pomeroy, Water
Rights, Sec. 69, 91, 92 and cases cited; Barnes v. Sabron, IO Nev. 217; Smith
v. O'Hara, 43 Cal. 371, 46 L.R.A. 175, 176; Ortman v. Dixon, 13 Cal. 34; Santa
Paula Waterworks v. Peralta, 113 Cal. 44, 45 Pac. 168; Wiggins v. Mascupiable
Land & Water Co., 113 Cal. 182, 32 L.R.A. 667, 45 Pac. 16o.
8 7 Utah 460, 27 Pac. 578.
'Same, Lytle Creek Water Co. v. Perdien (Cal.), 2 Pac. 732-The use was
measured by hours and minutes. See also, Comstock, State Eng., et at v. Ran-
say (Colo. 1913), 133 Pac. 11o7; Handy Ditch Co. v. Lowden. Irrig. Canal Co.,
27 Colo. 515, 6a Pac. 847; Ft. Lyon Canal Co. Chew, 33 Colo. 392, 81 Pac. 37;
New Castle La Paoudre Irrig. Co. v. Water Supply Co., 29 Colo. 469, 68 Pac.
78,; Baer Bros. Land & Cattle Co. v. Wilson, 38 Colo. IOI, 88 Pac. 265; Vogel,
et al v. Minn Canal Co., et a[, 47 Colo. 534, 107 Pac. iio8; Harvey v. Beaver
Co. Irrig. Co. (Utah, 1924), 234 Pac. 524 at pp. 528-529; Gardner v. Wright,
49 Ore. 6o9, 91 Pac. 294; Thorp v. Freed, I Mont. 65q, 665.
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under the original power used? The water cases suggest the latter.
Thus, if station A's waves normally extend over an area of one
thousand square miles, as determined by test of their audibility, A
must be regarded as using the wave length only in that area. Station
B, if it has established possessory rights by use of the same wave-
length beyond A's area, should be able to resist the extension of A's
activity to a point of interference with B.
It may be said that inasmuch as radio property rights are put upon
a common law basis the riparian rights of the East and Middle West
have as strong a claim to analogous application. But, as has been re-
marked above, the radio situation is so peculiar that the law governing
it must of necessity be somewhat peculiar. The reasons for applying
the doctrine of prior appropriation are very persuasive for applying
the same doctrine in the field of radio. As the exigencies which
prompted the western states to work out a doctrine unknown to the
common law never arose in the central and eastern states, it cannot
be said that they would not have worked out water rights as did the
western states.
But the very reasons underlying the riparian doctrine itself would
seem to make it important that the courts recognize the prior appro-
priator's rights in the field of radio. All riparian owners are entitled
to a reasonable use of the water. The late comers in radio, by in-
sisting on a right to broadcast at the same time as the first user is,
in effect making the ether unavailable to either. He does not concede
to the latter the right to any use of the ether although the riparian
cases guarantee a reasonable use. He is, in effect, doing the equivalent
of what a riparian owner would be doing if he poisoned the water.
Riparian rights certainly do not go that far. While there may be no
literal property right in the water itself, there is a usufructuary right
which should be protected.
The riparian cases weaken, rather than strengthen the case for radio.
It is submitted that the prior appropriation cases offer a saner solution
of radio's difficulties. Peculiar conditions deserve peculiar treatment.
If certain commentator's object to the expression "using the air"
their fears of inaccuracy should be dispelled by an application of eject-
ment law to radio. It may, perhaps, be better to say that the energy
transmitted by a station is simply occupying a position in space. Now,
a prior occupier of land is entitled to protection against a later comer.
It is elementary that the complainant in ejectment may recover as
against a mere trespasser on proof of his former occupation alone,
without regard to his title.8 6 The present legal right to possession
' See Bigelow's case-book, Rights in Land, Part I, Rights Incidental to Pos-
session.
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may be shown by evidence of prior possession by the complainant, even
though that possession be for a time less than twenty years; such
possession being sufficient to give rise to the presumption of title as
against a defendant who has subsequently acquired possession by mere
entry without any lawful right; provided, however, that such prior
possession of the complainant was not voluntarily relinquished with-
out the animus revertendi.87  If the radio station's energy is occupying
a definite position in space-in the ether-these principles by analogy
could very well show that a prior occupant in the ether has a prior
and, therefore, a higher right. And if the western mining cases are
again referred to they will serve to substantiate the analogy. Prior
to the passage of acts opening up public mineral lands to location and
purchase by citizens all persons who occupied such lands for the pur-
pose of mining were naked trespassers, at least, as against the United
States. But, as against a third person, the first occupant of a claim
was not regarded as a trespasser and was entitled to protection of the
law as a person in the possession of a portion of the public domain
with the assumed assent of the owner18 In some cases it has been
held that prior possession of public land without unything more, is
sufficient in ejectment against a trespasser."9
In view of the pioneering and experimenting of the earlier stations
in their attempt to perfect radio broadcasting, the language in Union
Oil Co. v. Smith9" is peculiarly apt:
Since . . . . exploration must precede the discovery of
materials, and some occupation of the land ordinarily is necessary for
adequate and systematic exploration, legal recognition of the pedi-pos-
session of a bona fide and qualified prospector is universally regarded
as a necessity. It is held that upon the public domain a miner may hold
the place in which he may be working against all others having no better
right, and, while, he remains in possession, diligently working toward
discovery, is entitled-at least for a reasonable time-to be protected
against forcible, fraudulent and clandestine intrusions upon his posses-
sion.91
' Bradshaw v. Ashby, 18o U.S. 59, 45 L. Ed. 423; Ratcliff v. Iron Works Co.,
87 Ky. 559, 10 S.W. 365; Omaha Co. v. Tabor (Colo. 1889), 5 L.R.A. 236, 242;
Knapp v. Winchester, II Vt. 35,; Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 5oo; Cook v.
Patterson,, 35 Ala. 102.
'Merced Mining Co., Fremont, 7 Cal. 317.
'Staininger v. Andrews, 4 Nev. 59; Caryell v. Cain, 16 Cal. 172; Hauxhurst
v. Landler, 28 Cal. 321; English v. Johnson, 17 Cal. 117.
00 249 U.S. 337, 63 L. Ed. 635.
Fraud, in using another station's wave-length, will be discussed in con-
nection with the trade-name cases. See also Zollers v. EvanIs, 2 McCrory 39,
5 Fed. 172, 173, 4 Mor. Min. Rep. 407; Crosanw v. Penderey, 2 McCrory 139,
8 Fed. 693, 694, 4 Mor. Min. Rep. 431; Johnson v. White, 88 C.C.A. 83, 16o
Fed. 9ol; Hanson v. Craig, 8g C.C.A. 55, 161 Fed 861, 863, 95 C.C.A. 338, 170
Fed. 62, 65; Gemmell v. Swain, 28 Mont. 331, 335, 98 Am. St. Rep. 570, 72 Pac.
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It would seem, without a straining of the imagination overmuch,
that the radio station which has peaceably operated on a wave-length
without interference has thereby become a prior peaceable occupier
under the familiar doctrine that possession confers a right which is
valid as against everyone who cannot show a prior and better right. 92
The analogy which is, perhaps, the easiest to suit to the field of
radio is that furnished by the law of trade-names, good-will and unfair
competition. To acquire the right to the exclusive use of a name,
device or symbol as a trade-mark it must appear that it was adopted
fpr the purpose of identifying the origin or ownership of the article
to which it is attached or that such trade-mark points distinctively either
by itself or by association to the origin . . . . or ownership of the
articles on which it is stamped. It must be designed, as its primary
object and purpose, to indicate the owner or producer of the commodity
and to distinguish it from like articles manufactured by others.9"
A right to the exclusive use of such trade-mark or trade-name
is so much a property right that it may be sold with the business to
which it is incident. While it may be that individual efforts give such
name or work its value at the outset, yet afterwards this is ordinarily
made permanent as a part of the entire organization or as appurtenant
to the locality in which the business is established, and thereafter
depends less on the individual efforts of the originator than on the
combined result of all that he created.9 4 The governing principle of
trade-mark law is peculiarly well fitted to this discussion in view of the
foregoing priority cases, namely, the right to the exclusive use of a
trade-mark depends upon its actual use in any locality and priority of
use outweighs priority of invention.95
Similarly, good will is the result of the employment of capital in
some established business. It augments its value and is an incident to
the conduct of the enterprise. It exists at the place where the business
is carried on and gives value to the enterprise because of the benefits
which arise from being connected with its reputation.96 It is a species
662, 22 Mor. Min. Rep. 716; New Eng. & C. Oil Co. v. Congdon, 152 Cal. 211,
92 Pac. i8o; Whiting v. Straup, 17 Wyoming 1, 19, 23, 129 Am. St. Rep. 1093,
95 Pac. 847; Phillip v. Brill, 17 Wyo. 26, 38, 95 Pac. 856.
Pollack and Wright, Possession, pp. 91-93.
Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 37 L. Ed. 1144 (1893) ; Dunbar
v. Glenn, 42 W. 118; Phoenix Mfg. Co. v. While, 148 W. 287, 135 N.W. 891;
J. I. Case Plow Works v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 162 W. 185, 155 N.W.
128; Hill v. Lockwood, 62 W. 507, 22 N.W. 581; Listinan Mill Co. v. Win. List-
nan Millings Co., 88 W. 334, 6o N.W. 261.
Le Page Co. v. Russia C. Co., 51 Fed. 941.
Col. Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 37 L. Ed. 1144 (1893); Gessler v.
Erwin Co., 182 W. 325, 193 N.W. 363 (2924).
'Lindenann v. Rusk, 125 W. 210, 104 N.W. II9.
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of assets or property with the usual incidents of property." The
goodwill may be indeterminate, fluctuating and uncertain, and yet, in
its aggregate benefit to the owner of the business, it is as definite as
the goodwill connected with a popular commercial telephone number is
said to be, 8 a valuable address book of prospective customers99 and
the like.
This brief r6sum6 of the law of trade-mark and goodwill should
serve to make its applicafion to radio quite simple. It has been the
custom, for several years, for persons engaged in broadcasting to des-
ignate their stations by certain combinations of letters, known as call
letters, and these call letters serve to enable people using radio re-
ceiving sets to identify each particular station. Such call letters are
a kind of trade-mark or trade-name. They distinguish stations engaged
in producing "similar articles" one from the other and become valuable
by continued use just as do the fancy and peculiar trade-marks hereto-
fore so well established in the law. Users of radio receiving sets
after a time become familiar with the particular letters employed and
this fact is of value to the broadcaster because the public has become
educated to the particular designation to such an extent as to assure to
him an audience during the customary hours of broadcasting.
Further, the radio receiving sets in general use in the United States
and Canada are scaled with numerical divisions, and by means of
dials or indicators, persons receiving the programs may set such dials
at particular points and hear the particular broadcasting station over
the particular wave-length that they desire. The dial reading as well
as the call-letters constitute a kind of trade-mark inasmuch as a dial
reading is universally associated with the call-letters and name of the
station that has built up the largest patronage. It designates origin
and ownership in the popular station that has first broadcasted at that
dial reading.
Where a station spends huge sums annually on "talent" it furnishes
a kind of entertainment that must attract a huge patronage which,
though indeterminate and fluctuating, is every bit as valuable as the
goodwill of the established commercial business house. Through indi-
vidual preference for its programs, hundreds of thousands of listeners
habitually turn the dials on their receiving sets to the position at which
they are accustomed to receive the program of that station. A habit
of continued patronage is thus gradually built up which habit makes
the dial reading and the call-letters characteristic and valuable since
they are associated with the excellence of the station's programs. Why
" Bank of Tomlwh v. Warren, 94 W. IS5, 68 N.W. 549 (1896).
' Ranft v. Refiners, 200 11. 386, 65 N.E. 720 (19o2).
Thoimpson v. Winnebago County, 48 Iowa 155 (188).
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should not, therefore, the established station have a property right in
such goodwill which is indistinguishable from the appropriated dial
reading and characteristic call-letters which together constitute its
trade-name?
Pursuing the analogy further, it 'Would seem that since the right to
a trade-name and goodwill may be lost through abandonment'0 0 the
right to a dial reading (wave-length) may. also be lost through an
abandonment without an animus re'aertendi.
Fraud likewise enters into the discussion. In the case of trade-
marks, a close imitation of the labels and style of package adopted by
a party . . . . which is obviously calculated to deceive the public
into the belief that the imitation is the original, is a fraud, and if it
appears that damage has resulted or must necessarily result from
such imitation, equity will relieve against it on the ground of fraud,
independently of the question of trade-mark.' 0 Owing to the limita-
tions set upon radio broadcasting, a fraud on the listening public can
readily be worked. It is not possible in the course of a program to
keep the call-letters constantly before the listeners.0 2  Consequently,
a little known station may, by using a popular station's wave-length
(dial-reading) deceive the listening public into thinking that it is
enjoying the popular station's program. Even though the trespasser
announce its call letters correctly the damage to the established station
and the benefit to the trespasser will already be accomplished. What
advertising the trespasser may have to disseminate can be successfully
broadcast night after night, since it is impossible for the public on
"tuning in" to determine readily the identity of the station in operation.
By the time the call-letters are given the work is done for good or ill.
A wave-length which the public has come to recognize as belonging
peculiarly to a station which has established a valuable reputation may
thus be "imitated" to the incalculable damage of such station. How-
ever, if it is true that the right in the wave-length is measured by the
amount (in time) of the appropriation (see water appropriation anal-
ogy, antie) such intruder would seem to be in the right since it is free to
exercise its right to appropriate the wave-length to be used during the
AvenaHrus v. Kornely, 139 W. 247, 121 N.W. 336.
"' Oppermann v. Waterman., 94 W. 583, 69 N.W. 569; Avenarius v. Kornely,
139 W. 247, 121 N.W. 336.
" See curious result of this shortcoming as detailed in Solicitors' Law
Jourital, Vol. 70, p. 317, Jan. 23, 1922. An imaginative description of the bol-
shevikis' sacking London, as narrated over the radio, became so graphic that a
number of suburban old ladies, listening in, suffered severe nervous shock.
Several persons gave up plans of staying at certain hotels in London. They had
all "tuned in" and "out" between announcements and so thought it news of the
day. (If space permitted it would be interesting to pursue further the subject
of torts by radio.)
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"free" time.10 3 The exercise of a clear legal right cannot be curtailed
by an incidental injury to others. This is damumo absque injuria. But
if (as in the Chicago Tribune case)'" it can be proved that the in-
truder had formerly enjoyed the use of another wave-length and
appropriated the complainant's wave-length to gain the advantage of
the complainant's extensive patronage, a case of fraud may still be
spelled out. 0 5 The intent may there be material.
The four analogies preceding are but attempts to suggest what diffi-
culties may beset those who must interpret and enforce the Radio Act
of 1917. Neither the electrical interference, the water, the ejectment
nor the trade-name cases, in themselves, furnish a strong ground for
the belief that a station may gain a property right in a wave-length, but
taken together, they present an array that should prove imposing when
the established stations insist that the Radio Act of 1927 may regulate
them but may not deprive them of vested rights.
III. RADIO ACT OF 1927
Inasmuch as the Radio Act of 1927106 is little more than a month
in existence (at this writing) commentators can but indulge in con-
jecture concerning its probable effect on the present chaos in the "air."
The quarrel will obviously lie between stations which are yet to be
licensed and the established stations which will claim to have rights
that the act will be powerless to destroy.
There can be no question as to the power of Congress to pass such
an act. Federal ownership of the ether, or the control of Congress
over interstate commerce make its enactment proper. 0 7 The mysteries
surrounding the nature of the ether make it difficult to postulate a
control of it by the Government 10 but that the radio is an instrument
of interstate commerce little doubt can exist. The act of 1912 was
based on this theory and such basis was recognized in the recent case
of Carmichael v. Anderson,'"° and, as yet no station has questioned
1' It must be remembered that the station and not the government chooses
the wave-length-Responsibility to the government, ante.
104 See the Chicago Tribune, Nov. 18, J926.
... Radio Control, pp. 56, ioi, 283; Sec. I (d) of Act. of '27.
103Revme .Turidique de la Radioelectricite, Avril-Juin, 1926, at page 119.
09 14 Fed. (2nd) 166 Z.W.D. Mo., July 19, 1926;
(a) Sec. i of the Act of 1912 (Comp. St. Sec. IOLOO) forbids the operation
of radio apparatus where interference would be caused with receipt of mes-
sages or signals from beyond the jurisdiction of the state or territory in which
it is situated except under Federal license.
(b) The Act of 1927 may also be considered an attempt to apply to Radio
the test that is now applied in the states generally to public utilities. It amounts
practically to the issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity
in advance of the obtaining of a license for radio communication. (See Sec.
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this usurpation of power so to regulate radio. It must be remembered
that the development of the telegraph raised the very nice question as
to whether the commerce clause" 0 referred only to the stage-coach,
boat or railroad which handled some tangible package or object which
was transmitted from one point to another. In bridging the difficult
gap between the railroad and the telegraph which latter transmitted
between the states a mere wave of electrical energy, Chief Justice
Waite, in the Pensacola Telegraph case,"' said, "By telegraph the move-
ment of ships is directed. The telegraphic announcement of the market
abroad regulates prices at home. It is indispensable as a means of
inter-communication but especially is it so in commercial trans-
actions..... .The powers thus granted to Congress are not con-
fined to the instrumentalities of commerce known or in use when the
Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace with the progress of
the country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of time
and circumstances."' 2  It would seem, therefore, that the analogy
between the radio wave as an instrumentality of interstate commerce
and the telegraph is a much closer one than that between the telegraph
and the railroad, as the electro-magnetic energy which is the basis of
communication in the case of both radio and telegraphy by wire has
already received judicial cognizance as a means of commercial inter-
course.
Even though it should be urged that there is no direct commercial
gain got from radio that is no difficulty. Congress may regulate
matters of interstate commerce in which there is no element of com-
mercial gain."" At any rate (as was shown in division II, ante),
Broadcasting is a commercial business.
Undoubtedly, many of the smaller stations will resist government
control by insisting that their broadcasting is purely local and there-
fore subject to state control alone. For two reasons this position is
untenable. In the first place, the Secretary of Commerce has, under
the Act of 1912, required all stations to be licensed irrespective of their
power. Such practice indicates that the Federal Government, at least,
9, Sub. Sec. Ii of Act of 1927 and see also Sec. 196.52 of Wis. Sts. and the
annotations thereto.)
0 U. S. Constitution, Article i, Sec. 8 (3).
"' Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. I, 24 L. Ed. 708
(1877).
"'See also Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 64o (i888) ; Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Commercial Milling. Co., 218 U.S. 4o6 (Igio).
" The White Slave Acts apply even in cases of private concubinage. Com-
elletti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 37 S. Ct. (917); U.S. v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393,
52 L. Ed. 543 (1908). See also International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S.
91, io6, 54 L. Ed. 678 (igio).
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considers broadcasting as interstate commerce. It is significant that no
distinction is made between the capacity of the very weak and the very
powerful stations to penetrate extra-territorially. Such a distinction
seems out of the question in the field of radio. The range of even the
weakest station can be so enormously extended by favoring atmospheric
conditions as to equal the normal sending range of the more powerful.
All stations are engaged either in interstate or in intrastate commerce.
Their character cannot be gauged by anything so chimerical, transitory
and elusive as the ever-changing "range." A station cannot be sending
interstate communications on Monday night and intrastate communica-
tion on Wednesday night merely because in the interim the ether has
developed a tantrum. Since the capacity of receiving sets varies so
greatly it cannot be said that evefn the weakest station may not be
heard out of the state.
Conceding that some stations might not be heard out of the state
of origin, still, they would interfere locally with the reception of out-
of-state programs and so would come within the power of Congress
to "prevent the common instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate
commercial intercourse from being used in their intrastate' operations
to the injury of interstate commerce.n 4
Such being the powe~s of Congress with respect to the control of
radio, it is apparent that radio stations must submit to regulation
without exception. And, therefore, stations which are to be licensed
in the future can properly be required to comply with certain conditions
with regard to wave-length, power, hours of operation, etc. Those
already in existence must comply with the regulatory. features of the
new act. But whether the Secretary of Commerce can refuse without
cause, to permit the old stations to continue in operation is sure
to be disputed.
It would be useless and tedious to repeat what has been said in
the course of this paper, but the reader is asked to recall the effect of
what has been stated with regard to a station's responsibility to the
Federal Government and the possibility that user and the expenditure
of huge sums of money have given such station a property right in a
wave-length or, at least, to continue to broadcast. Such recollection
will make it apparent that the new Act in some respects may prove
unavailing.
Section I of the Act of 1927 provides that there may be use but
no ownership of a wave-channel. Mr. Carl Zollmann 115 says: ". . ..
to hold that such a license is a property right subverts not only every
legal conception connected with such license, but does away with
""The Shreveport Case, 234 U.S. 342, 353, 58 L. Ed., 1341 (1914).
I MARQuETrn LAW REVIEW, April, 1927, "Radio Act of 1927."
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the well known distinction between a mere license and an incorporeal
hereditament." It is respectfully submitted that there are licenses
and licenses. "A rose by another name would smell as sweet." Calling
a white horse black changes the designation but not the color. So
with a license granted to existing stations under the Act of 1912. The
Secretary of Commerce had power to grant perpetval franchises." 6
The fact that he granted them for ninety days is immaterial. That
license amounted to nothing more than a perfunctory permission to
broadcast. What the Secretary of Commerce did could in no wise
enlarge his power which came from the Act of 1912 alone. An operat-
ing station had the right to use the ether in perpetuity so long as
it complied with the regulations established and before the enactment
of the Act of 1927 there was no statutory limitation whatever on the
right so to use the ether. 1 7 That being the case, the Act of 1927
may be attempting to take from established stations a vested right
which was gained by an initial licensing and subsequent appropriation
of a wave-length and user under the license." 8 When Section 5H(5)
of the Act of 1927 declares that stations applying for new licenses
must waivd existing rights it is attempting by indirection what the act
could not do directly. It is taking (perhaps) property without due
process of law." 9 To resort to analogy again: Thompson's Law of
Electricity lays down the general rule that when a city grants an
electric company a right to supply a city's light and the company
spends money on equipment it gets a vested right to the use of the
designated streets; and the license cannot thereafter be revoked by the
municipality. The radio situation is practically the same. 20
A license to come into existence'2 can be distinguished from a
license purporting to confer but a short and restricted user.'1 2  A
license under the Act of 1912 might be likened to the Homestead
Laws under which the government land (the free element-in radio,
the ether) becomes the user's irrevocably in fee simple if he makes
proper application, is accepted and conforms to the required regula-
tions.. The fact that after the patent is issued the government steps
out of the picture furnishes no great barrier to the analogy. Further
regulation would be needless. In the case of radio, after the station
35 Op. Att'y-Gen. 131-2. Radio Control, p. 24.
1135 Op. Att'y-Gen. 131-2. Radio Control, p. 33.
" See Common Law (II), etc., ante.
'The Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution
refers to substantive as well as procedural rights. (Nebraska German Language
Cases and Oregon School Case.)
'Radio Control, p. IO.
Act of 1912.
reAct of 1927.
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is once in existence, continued regulation is necessary for the public
good (because radio is affected with the public interest), just as
continued regulation of railroads is essential even though they gain
vested rights by user under their charters (revocable for cause under
the reserve power of state constitutions).
Since the Act of 1912 provides for the issuing of licenses "to be"
in perpetuum (which are merely the conditions under which vested
rights are gained by a subsequent user, rather than a continuing and
ephemeral cause of "wave-life") a refusal to grant an established
station a new license under the Act of 1927 would seem to be taking
property without due process of law. A lawful business may be
regulated but it may not be destroyed. Broadcasting is a lawful busi-
ness, 2 3 the performance of which builds valuable "good-will" in which
there may be a property right. And, in view of the earlier discussion,
the power of the Secretary of Commerce under Section 4 of the Act
of 1927 to designate call-letters may be questioned as an attempt to
take away trade-name property rights without due process of law.
The waiver, provided in Section 5H(5), is a subterfuge that can de-
ceive no one.
The Act of 1927 is excellently designed to care for the future when
many of the stations will have been forced by high operating cost to
discontinue, but some doubt must exist as to its power to dispel the
present confusion. The one remedy most needed is a reduction of
the number of stations but that may not be possible in view of the
claims of established stations to vested rights "in the air." For the
same reason a re-assignment of wave-lengths and power may not be
possible. 2 4 Time, and the patient construction of the courts, can alone
determine the fate of Radio Communication.
'See, ante, Common Law, etc.
' Section 38 of the Act of 1927 provided--"If any provision of the Act
shall be held invalid the remainder of the act and the application of such pro-
vision to others shall not be affected." This section may come to be the line
of demarkation which shall make of the Act two Acts, one applicable to stations
licensed since its enactment; the other, applicable to stations licensed under the
Act of 1912.
